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A Novel Dataset Measuring Change in
Copyright Exceptions
Michael Palmedo 1
December 2021

Abstract
Copyrights grant creators long periods of market exclusivity during which they or their agents
have the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute their works. However, copyright exceptions
limit their scope and strength. The laws on both copyright protection and copyright exceptions
vary substantially from one country to the next. This working paper introduces a novel, surveybased dataset that describes changes to 24 countries’ laws on copyright exceptions over time. To
explore the data, I construct two indices from subsets of the dataset; one that focus on exceptions
related to ICT technologies and another that focuses on educational uses. The indices show that
copyright exceptions have grown stronger since 1990, and that wealthier countries tend to have
stronger exceptions than poorer ones. Initial empirical tests suggest that exceptions related to
ICT technologies are stronger in countries with larger ICT sectors, and exceptions for
educational uses are stronger in countries with higher educational attainments. Both types of
exceptions are negatively associated with the share of GDP produced by the copyright-producing
industries. Countries have stronger exceptions when they have entered into trade agreements
with the U.S., though bilateral American pressure to strengthen copyright protection is associated
with weaker exceptions related to ICT technologies.

1
I wear two hats at American University. I am the Assistant Director for Interdisciplinary Research at the
American University Washington College of Law Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property; and I
am an economics PhD Candidate at the College of Arts and Sciences. The dataset presented was developed as a
research project at the law school, and it is part of my dissertation-in-progress. I wish to thank economics professors
Walter Park, Robert Feinberg, and Kara Reynolds for their input in the presentation of the data; and law professors
Sean Flynn, Peter Jaszi, and Michael Carroll for their help with construction of the survey upon which it is based.
Furthermore, I would like to thank the participants at the 2018 meeting of the Society for the Economic Research of
Copyright Issues for their feedback. Finally, I am deeply indebted to the attorney-respondents who completed the
survey: Beatriz Busaniche, Kimberlee Weatherall, Enyinna S Nwauche, Allan Rocha de Souza, David Fewer and
Lucie Guibault, J. Carlos Lara, Hong Xue, Marcela Palacio-Puerta, Taina Pihlajarinne and Anette Alén-Savikko,
Jyh-An Lee, Shamnad Basheer, Pankhuri Agarwal, Tatsuhiro Ueno, Ayuko Hashimoto, Heesob Nam, Andrés
Izquierdo, Marco Caspers, Miguel Morachimo, Teresa Nobre, Daniel Seng, David Tan, Zuzana Adamová, Caroline
Ncube, Simon Schlauri, Jyh-An Lee, Maksym Naumko, Andriy Bichuk, Rami Olwan, Peter Jaszi and Nhan T.T.
Dinh.

Introduction
Copyright and copyright exceptions
Intellectual property laws involve a tradeoff between the interests of creators and consumers
of information goods. Copyrights grant the creators of new literary and artistic works long
periods of market exclusivity during which they or their agents have the exclusive right to
reproduce and distribute their works. This incentivizes the creation of new works (Landes &
Posner, 1989), but it also can lead to high prices for consumers and follow-on creators. For
instance, high prices have been shown to lead to piracy in online media markets (Karaganis,
2011), as well as lack of access to scholarly works (Albert, 2006; Adcock & Fottrell, 2008).
Copyrights can also have unintended impacts on firms in the information & communications
technology (ICT) sector, which complement information goods. For instance, if internet service
providers are liable for infringements made by their customers, they face extra litigation risks
which can impede investment and innovation in those industries (Lerner & Rafert, 2015).
To mitigate these types of consequences, copyright laws include exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by copyrights. All countries that are Members of the WTO are required to have
both copyright protection for creators and copyright exceptions for consumers, but the laws on
both vary greatly from one country to the next.
Some exceptions are very narrow, allowing only very specific uses of copyrighted works.
For example, the Ukrainian educational exception allows a teacher may reproduce a single copy
of a work for use in the classroom, but she cannot distribute copies to students to take home, nor
can she use copies for her own research purposes (Ukraine, 2017). Other exceptions are very
broad. The Indian Copyright act’s educational use exception permits “the reproduction of any

Table 1: Costs and Benefits of Copyright Exceptions

Short Run
Benefits

Greater access to books, articles, music, and
other copyrighted works increases consumer
welfare.
Follow-on creators that build upon earlier
works can obtain works at lower cost,
reducing overall production costs.

Costs

Long Run

More follow-on works available in the market.

Firms that complement the copyright
industries (i.e. – ISPs that allow people to
share works online) able to develop new
products and services, or improve existing
ones.

More variety and efficiency in the distribution
of copyrighted works.

Lower sales of copyrighted works by
copyright owners or their licensees. Producer
welfare falls.

Less compensation for authors, musicians,
other creators. Fewer people relying on
creative endeavors for their primary income.

Declines of sales by firms that distribute
copyrighted works (i.e. – publishers, record
companies). Lower returns to these
complementary distributors.

Contraction of distribution sector.

work – by a teacher or a pupil in the course of instruction” (India, 2012), and the courts have
interpreted this to include copies of full textbooks distributed outside of the classroom.

Costs and benefits of strong copyright exceptions
There are various costs and benefits associated with broad, open copyright exceptions.
These costs and benefits accrue to creators, distributors, and other industries that complement the
creation of works. Table 1 summarizes the basic tradeoffs.
In the short run, more consumers will be able to access copyrighted works without
authorization, and without payment, leading to an obvious increase in consumer welfare.
Authors, researchers, and others who use existing works as inputs to the creation of new works

also gain, because they may be able to obtain those inputs without payment, lowering their
overall costs. Finally, there are benefits that may accrue to complimentary industries providing
consumers ways to access and share information goods. Often these are in the ICT industries –
Blackboard, YouTube, and WeChat are examples. When customers are legally able to copy and
share content, the law creates demand for new ways to do this, and firms will step in to meet this
demand (Lohmann, 2008).
The long run benefits from stronger copyright exceptions flow from the short run benefits to
creators and complementary firms. If creators who rely upon earlier works to create new ones are
able to access those earlier works at a lower cost, it is reasonable to hypothesize that their output
may increase. Similarly, as complementary industries emerge to help people reproduce and share
content, the distribution market may become more efficient and/or have a larger variety of ways
in which consumers can access works.
The costs of stronger copyright exceptions are largely borne by the producers and
distributors of copyrighted works. They are rather straightforward. If the availability of free
copies of articles, books, or other types of copyrighted works cuts into their sales, creators and
distributors will experience a fall in income. In the long run, the number of people able to make
a living in the creative industries will fall. The distribution industries will decline in terms of
revenue and employment involved in the old ways of distributing works, though there is room
for them to evolve into new types of intermediaries, as the record industry is currently doing
(Siwek, 2018).

Previous Empirical Literature
A small body of empirical work has shown relationships between the structure of copyright
exceptions and various outcomes.
One body of empirical work focuses on research exceptions for data mining. Some writers
have addressed the link between copyright exceptions that explicitly permit data mining (defined
as machine-assisted analysis of large datasets), and research that relies on it. The process of data
mining necessitates copying large quantities of content from original sources and therefore
requires authorization from rightholders in many jurisdictions. However, some countries have
specific exceptions for data mining, or have broad exceptions that permit the process without
authorization. Handke, Guibault and Vallbé (2015) find that in "countries in which data mining
for academic research requires the express consent of rights holders, data mining makes up a
significantly lower share of total research output." Similarly, Filippov (2014) finds that the
structure of copyright law in EU countries has reduced the number of published papers that
utilize data mining techniques. Hargreaves et al. (2014) use Filippov’s data to find that
researchers in the U.S. and Canada produce more articles based on datamining than those in
European countries with more restrictive copyright limitations applicable to datamining. Though
these studies are narrow in scope, they illustrate that the structure of copyright exceptions in
countries’ laws can have a measurable impact on the use of copyrighted works.
Legal academics have argued that copyright exceptions for researchers will drive the
creation of more academic works by lower the cost of obtaining research materials (Geiger,
2009; Ginsburg, 2013). Palmedo (2019) tested this hypothesis, finding that robust exceptions
have been positively associated with researcher output in a sample of 21 countries.

Other papers have explored potential relationships between copyright exceptions and
Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs). Lerner and Rafert (2015) demonstrate
that a court ruling clarifying copyright exceptions for cloud storage increased venture capital
funding to American cloud technology firms. Ghafele and Friedman (2014) find that technology
hardware firms in Singapore enjoyed faster growth after the nation’s introduction of fair use 2 in
2006. Palmedo (2017) finds that technology hardware firms in countries with fair use spent more
on research and development and subsequently received more patents than other countries. A
white paper published by an ICT trade association list a number of activities carried out by ICT
firms that would be illegal without robust copyright exceptions such as fair use. These uses
include internet search, caching, and hosting (Szamosszegi & McCleary, 2017).
Though there is limited empirical work on copyright limitations, there is a broader empirical
literature examining copyright’s incentive for the creation of new works. Some researchers have
studied the effects of copyright extension. Reichmann (1996), Kuhne (2004), Ku, Sun and Fan,
(2009) and Png and Wang (2009) find no evidence to suggest that copyright term extension led
to more production of new works, yet Rappaport (1998) estimates that an extended copyright
term would lead to $330 million in royalties and states that the net proceeds from the fee would
be devoted to promoting the creative arts. Others have studied the effects of piracy on the
creation of new works. Telang and Waldfogel (2014) find that high levels of piracy depress the

2

Fair Use is a copyright exception found in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act. A handful of other
countries have adopted it. Fair Use allows the unauthorized use of a copyrighted work as long the use is “fair”,
which is determined by consideration of four factors - "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" (United States, 1976). It is not
confined to certain types of uses, and is therefore considered by many legal academics to grant wider latitude for
unauthorized uses than most other copyright exceptions. For more, see the U.S. Copyright Office’s guide at
https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html.

production of new Bollywood films. Hollifield, Vlad, and Becker (2003) find that stronger
copyright protection has been associated with the production of more print media. On the other
hand, Waldfogel (2011) finds that increased file sharing through Napster decreased the
effectiveness of copyright for recorded music in the U.S. – yet it led to no decrease in the
creation of musical works. For more comprehensive reviews of empirical copyright literature,
see Handke (2011), and the Copyright Evidence Wiki (CREATe Centre, 2018).

Measuring Change in Copyright Exceptions
This working paper introduces a novel, survey-based dataset, which describes changes to
countries’ laws on copyright exceptions over time. The dataset is a tool for further econometric
research, and it is available online in both coded and “human-readable” form. 3 It was created
through a research project at American University College of Law.
The dataset differs from existing sources of information on the variation in copyright
exceptions between one country and the next, including surveys by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (Seng, 2017; Crews, 2015; WIPO Secretariat, 2010), and legal academics
(Hilty & Nérisson, 2012). All of these previous studies are static. The dataset presented here is
unique because it allows one to study changes in the laws over time and across countries.
The dataset covers 24 countries and 27 years. 4 Thirteen of the countries are currently
classified as High Income by the World Bank, and the rest are classified as Middle Income.
(Over the period studied, some countries advanced from Low- to Middle income and from
Middle- to Upper income.) The distinction is relevant because legal academics have argued that

3

http://infojustice.org/survey
Some countries in the dataset have data going back to 1970. However, there is annual data for most countries
in the dataset from 1990 to 2016.
4

Table 2. Countries in the Dataset

High Income Countries

Middle Income Countries

•

Australia

•

Argentina

•

Canada

•

Botswana

•

Chile

•

Brazil

•

Finland

•

China

•

Japan

•

Colombia

•

Korea

•

India

•

Netherlands

•

Mexico

•

Portugal

•

Peru

•

Singapore

•

South Africa

•

Slovakia

•

Ukraine

•

Switzerland

•

Vietnam

•

Taiwan

•

United States

copyright laws in less wealthy countries tend to have weaker exceptions than copyright laws in
wealthy countries – despite the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities allowing countries policy space
to permit certain unauthorized uses (Okediji, 2019; Deere, 2008). Table 2 list the countries by
income group.
To create the survey, American University Washington College of Law hosted a series of
workshops with copyright attorneys. The completed survey was administered to law professors
in their home countries. Respondents gave legal citations for all of their answers, and American
University law students checked the citations to verify their accuracy.
The survey was comprised of 129 questions, grouped into 20 categories. Table 3 shows the
categories and gives a very brief description of each.

Table 3: Categories of Survey Questions

Copyright Exception

Description

General Exception

Openly worded exception that allows a wide range of uses, on the condition that a
“fairness” test would be passed. Includes the “fair use” provisions found in the laws of
the U.S. and a handful of other countries, as well as the “fair dealing” provisions
common in former British colonies.

Quotation

Allows the unauthorized reproduction and/or sharing of parts of a copyrighted work
for the purpose of quotation.

Education

Allows unauthorized reproduction and/or sharing of copyrighted works (or parts
thereof) for educational purposes.

Research

Allows unauthorized reproduction and/or sharing of copyrighted works (or parts
thereof) for research purposes. This may or may not include commercial research.

Personal or Private
Uses

Allows unauthorized reproduction and/or sharing of copyrighted works (or parts
thereof) for personal use. This sometimes includes sharing in small groups such as
families or peers.

Computer Programs

Allows reproduction and use of copies of computer programs without authorization.
This exception may exist for a variety of purposes.

Databases or Other
Compilations of NonOriginal Facts

Allows unauthorized reproduction and/or sharing of databases or other compilations of
facts for various purposes. This may take the form limits to the scope of copyright so
that these collections are not eligible for protection in the first place.

Text- and Datamining

Allows unauthorized reproduction and use of works by machines in order to mine the
works via text-or datamining processes.

Library Rights

Allows unauthorized reproduction and/or sharing of copyrighted works (or parts
thereof) by libraries, for a variety of purposes.

Disability Access

Allows unauthorized reproduction and/or sharing of copyrighted works (or parts
thereof) for the purpose of making works available to people with sight or hearing
difficulties.

Transformative Use

Allows the unauthorized transformation of a protected work into a new work with a
different purpose and intended audience.

Parody and/or Satire

Allows the unauthorized use of copyrighted work (or parts thereof) in the creation of
new works of parody or satire.

Incidental Inclusion

Allows the unauthorized inclusion of a copyrighted work when it is incorporated into a
new one. For example, a radio playing in the background when a scene is filmed.

Panorama Right

Allows the unauthorized reproduction of visual works stored in public spaces, such as
architecture and public art.

Orphan Works

Allows the unauthorized reproduction and use of works (or parts thereof) for which the
rightholder cannot be identified after a reasonable search (“orphan works”).

National Government
Works

Allows the unauthorized reproduction and use of works created by the national
government. This exception may come in the form of limitations to the scope of
copyright that prevent copyright protection of such works in the first place.

Exhaustion of Rights

States that once a rightholder has sold or licensed their work, their commercial rights
are “exhausted” and cannot be used to prevent further unauthorized reproductions or
uses. (Exhaustion can be national, regional or international. Regional or international
exhaustion allows parallel imports.)

Safeguards from
Secondary/Intermediary
Liability

Protects internet service providers/ intermediaries from liability when their customers
or users infringe copyrights (i.e. – when someone posts a copyrighted video on social
media). Usually contingent upon good faith efforts by the intermediaries to remove
infringing content upon request.

Temporary Copies for
Technological
Processes

Allows temporary copies to be made to allow for the functioning of technological
processes (i.e. - caching content).

Protection Against
Supremacy of Contracts

Does not allow voluntary contracts between copyright holders (or their agents) and
their customers to override the copyright exceptions found in a country’s law.

The survey asks if a country’s law had an exception for each category in in 1970, and it asks
respondents to give the year and a description of legal changes between 1970 and the present. It
asks additional questions about the qualities of each exception if one existed, which describe
how widely each can be used. Respondents were asked to include changes in both legislated and
non-legislated law (examples of non-legislated law include court decisions and administrative
rulings). The complete survey is attached as Appendix 1.
In order to gauge the level of uncertainty surrounding legal rights of users, respondents
answered these questions on a four-point scale running from “Cleary Not Included” to “Clearly
Included.” Their answers were coded 0 to 3. Ambiguity could exist due to differing
interpretations of legal texts, or due to judicial interpretations of laws that predate legislative
change.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics by question category
Category
General Exception
Quotation
Education
Research
Personal or Private Uses
Computer Programs
Databases or Other Compilations of Non-Original Facts
Text- and Datamining
Library Rights
Disability Access
Transformative Use
Parody and/or Satire
Incidental Inclusion
Panorama Right
Orphan Works
National Government Works
Exhaustion of Rights
Safeguards from Secondary/Intermediary Liability
Temporary Copies for Technological Processes
Protection Against Supremacy of Contracts

Mean

St. Dev.

1.01

1.32

2.09

1.18

1.64

1.30

1.53

1.33

1.80

1.27

1.43

1.33

0.93

1.24

0.46

0.92

1.81

1.33

1.28

1.33

0.69

1.06

1.31

1.25

1.17

1.34

1.77

1.33

0.75

1.18

1.38

1.34

1.32

1.31

0.62

1.14

1.00

1.31

0.64

0.93

Survey Scores by Question Category
Table 4 shows the average score by category of question. For each category, the survey asks
whether an exception is included in the country’s law. It then asks a series of follow-on questions

relevant to that particular exception. These vary from one category to the next, but they generally
include whether the exception can be applied to unauthorized uses for any type of work, any
purpose, any type of user, and whether it can be used for commercial purposes. Some categories
also include additional questions relevant only to the category at hand. For instance, the category
“Computer Programs” includes a question asking whether the exception can be applied to
unauthorized reproduction occurring during reverse engineering. The category for libraries
includes the question of whether the exception allows unauthorized reproduction to provide
copies for other libraries. Appendix 2 shows all of the survey questions that are included in the
totals listed in Table 4.
Certain copyright exceptions are generally stronger than others in the countries’ national
laws. The mean score for exceptions protecting quotation, education uses, and personal or private
uses is above 1.5. These types of exceptions are well-established in international copyright law.
The Berne Convention of 1886 explicitly endorses copyright exceptions for quotation and
education. Most countries have allowed come sort of personal use exception for a long time
(Schwartz, 2014).
On the other hand, the copyright exceptions related to ICT technologies tend to be weaker.
The surveyed countries are less likely to have protections for text- and data-mining, databases,
transformative uses and safeguards for intermediary liability in their law. When national laws do
include these types of laws, the exceptions tend to be more restricted in terms of the type of uses
they permit. The average scores for each of these types of copyright exceptions are below 1.0.

Indices
The 20 categories can be used to divide the data into two overlapping thematic subgroups of
copyright exceptions based on the type of user activity the exception protects. Below I describe
two such subgroups: copyright exceptions for use by ICT firms’ activities and those of their
consumers, and use for educational purposes.
Table 5: Copyright Exceptions for Two Types of Uses

Exceptions related to Internet Communications
Technologies

Exceptions related to Education

• General Exception

• General Exception

• Quotation

• Education

• Research

• Research

• Personal Or Private Uses

• Personal or Private Uses

• Computer Programs

• Library Rights

• Databases Or Other Compilations Of NonOriginal Facts

• Exhaustion of Rights

• Text And Data-Mining
• Transformative Use
• Safeguards From Secondary Liability
• Temporary Copies For Technological Processes
• Supremacy Of Contracts

Table 5 shows the categories of copyright exceptions relevant to each subgroup. The
exceptions related to ICTs include those needed for technological processes, such as the making
of temporary copies to perform internet search functions and protection from liability when
customers post infringing content. This group also includes important exceptions for users of
ICTs, such as the quotation right (for people who post clips of articles on social media) and the
transformative use right (for people who make mashups online). The exceptions related to

education are those used by teachers and students in order to access and share materials for
learning and research purposes. For the purpose of this paper, I drop observations before 1990. 5
I create two indices using the mean scores by category. For each year,
•

tech = mean of the category scores for the eleven categories related to Internet
Communications Technologies (ICT) in Table 5

•

edu = mean of the category scores for the six categories related to educational uses in
Table 5

Table 6 gives descriptive statistics for each index, and Figure 1 shows the histograms. The
data is not skewed, but it is not exactly normal either. The indexes are correlated, with a
correlation coefficient of 0.794. The mean value of Edu is higher than the mean for Tech,
indicating that copyright exceptions for education are more open than those meant to protect ICT
firms.
Figure 2 graphs the mean index scores for each of the indexes by year, disaggregated by
income group. One can see three things upon casual observation. First, the mean value of all
three indexes has gradually increased over time, indicating that copyright exceptions have slowly
grown stronger. This is true for high- and middle-income countries. Second, the high-income
countries in the set have consistently had stronger copyright exceptions than the middle-income
countries, supporting the assertions by Okediji (2019) and Deere (2009) that developing
countries have not taken full advantage of TRIPS flexibilities for copyright. Third, the gap

5

Some of the respondents’ answers did not describe the state of the law in the earlier years they were asked.
Most surveys have responses for all of the questions from approximately 1990 through 2016. In order to use a
dataset with data on each index in each country for each year, I would need to drop all observations prior to 2000.

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Two Copyright Exceptions Indices

Tech

Edu

Mean

1.13

1.52

St. Dev.

0.60

0.66

Skewness

0.33

-0.26

N

637

637

Figure 1: Histograms of Three Copyright Exception Indices
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Figure 2: Average Index Scores for High- and Middle Income Countries, by Year

Exceptions for Education
3.0

2.5

2.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016

3.0

HIC
LMIC

1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016

Excepions for ICT Tech

between copyright exceptions in more and less wealthy countries is growing. This is especially
the case for exceptions that benefit technology firms.

Testing Covariates
This section reports the results of initial empirical tests on covariates. Tech and Edu are
regressed against sector- and country-specific independent variables in a series of panel
regressions with fixed effects each country and year, and with errors clustered by country. It does
not seek to establish causality, but to show correlations between the indices, relevant sectors, and
macroeconomic indicators.

Regressions on Tech
The regressions on Tech draw on the framework of potential costs and benefits presented in
the first section. “Computer Services” firms that complement the copyright industries – such as
ISPs as web hosts – theoretically benefit from stronger copyright exceptions, so one would
expect a positive correlation with Tech. Conversely, the copyright industries themselves – print,
sound and multimedia publishers that distribute copyrighted works – may face lower sales if
more people can access works free, so one would expect a negative correlation with Tech.
The regressions test these assumption using data from the EU PREDICT dataset, the most
comprehensive set of computer services and copyright industry data over time available. 6 This
source contains data from “official sources (such as National Accounts … from Eurostat and
OECD)” for all EU countries, as well as 12 other comparator countries. This overlaps with 14 of

6

EU PREDICT data available at https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/predict/ict-sector-analysis-2018/data-metadata

the countries in PIJIP’s Copyright User Rights Database: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong
Kong, Finland, India, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Switzerland, and the
United States. The countries from database which are not represented in the PREDICT dataset
are the smaller non-European economies (plus Mexico). Annual data is available from 1995 on.
The variables used to test the relationship – Comp. Services Share and Copyright Sector
Share – are the ratio of each of these sectors’ value added to that country’s GDP in a given year.
The values are small, with means of 1.5% and 0.8%, respectively.
Table 7 shows the results of the tests. Column (1) shows that Comp. Services Share is
positive and Column (2) shows that Copyright Sector Share is negative, as expected. The results
are significant at the 99% level of confidence. When the two are both included on the right hand
side, the significance of Copyright Share drops to the 95% level of confidence.
Country level controls are added in Columns (4) and (5). Their addition causes the
significance of Comp. Services Share and Copyright Share to fall to 95% and 90%, respectively.
Logged constant GDP per capita in U.S. dollars is taken from the World Bank and included
as a regressor. The coefficient is positive and significant, confirming the positive relationship
suggested by the difference in mean values of Tech for high- and middle-income countries
shown in Figure 3.
Columns (4) and (5) also include FTA, a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years in which a
country has a bilateral or regional free trade agreement with the U.S. in force. (Observations
from the U.S. are dropped in the regressions reported in these two columns.) When a country
enters into a trade agreement with the U.S., it must strengthen intellectual property protection in
its law to meet FTA obligations. If the country is under pressure to implement its obligations in a

Table 7: Dependent Variable – Tech
Panel Regressions with F.E. for countries and years
(1)
Comp. Services Share

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.924***
(0.277)

0.318***
(0.075)
-0.593**
(0.228)

0.212**
(0.086)
-0.482*
(0.232)
0.304*
(0.163)
0.527***
(0.113)

0.207**
(0.078)
-0.501*
(0.234)
0.285*
(0.143)
0.453***
(0.113)
-0.112**
(0.048)

2.163***
(0.213)
208
0.101

1.417***
(0.229)
308
0.361

-1.698
(1.521)
286
0.568

-1.426
(1.330)
286
0.585

0.346***
(8.518)

Copyright Share
(Log) GDP per capita
FTA
Special 301

Constant
N
Within Entity R2

0.918***
((0.131)
308
0.322

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

way that favors rightholders, it may be incentivized to weaken copyright exceptions (Deere,
2008). On the other hand, countries often amend their copyright laws in ways that both
strengthen copyright protections and enhance exceptions at the same time, as lawmakers try to
balance competing interests for the greater good (Guibault, Helberger, Hugenholtz, van Eechoud,
& van Gompel, 2009). Therefore, implementation of a trade agreement may lead to stronger
copyright exceptions by necessitating amendments to countries’ laws. Australia provides an
example – it strengthened its copyright exception allowing temporary copies for technological
processes when it implemented the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement in 2004 (Burrell &
Weatherall, 2008). The coefficient on FTA is positive and significant across all specifications in
Table 4, supporting the notion that countries will tend to strengthen exceptions when they revisit
their copyright laws to comply with trade agreements.

Special 301 measures negative trade pressures on a country, intended to force them to
strengthen IPR protections. It is a dummy variable equal to 1 for country-year observations
when a country was included in the U.S. Trade Representative’s annual Special 301 Report,
which lists countries alleged to provide inadequate protection of intellectual property.
Inclusion in the report indicates that a country is facing pressure from the U.S. government
to strengthen IPR protections. If the report identifies a country as a “Priority Foreign Country”,
this designation triggers a Trade Act investigation that, in turn, can lead to sanctions
(Congressional Research Service, 2020). A country may also be placed on watch lists, which
indicates that the U.S. will further engage with it regarding its alleged intellectual property
shortcomings. Countries on the PWL or WL are usually the subject of further diplomatic and
trade pressures to change their domestic policies. Special 301 is included in Column (6), and it is
negative and significant, as expected. The U.S. Trade Representative has listed countries in the
Report for having copyright exceptions it views as too permissive of unauthorized copying of
works – a recent example is the 2020 Special 301 Report’s criticism of South African copyright
legislation (U.S. Trade Representative, 2020) – so inclusion in the report can be an incentive for
a country to weaken copyright exceptions.
The most complete specification, shown in Column (6) shows a number of significant
associations with covariates. The coefficients on Comp. Services Share and Copyright Share are
significant and have the expected signs. A one-percentage point increase in the computer service
industries’ share of value added in a country’s GDP is associated with a 0.20 increase in Tech. A
one-percentage point increase in the copyright industries’ share of GDP is associated with a 0.50
decrease in Tech. The controls for logged GDP per capita and the presence of an FTA are
positively associated, and the placement of a country on the Special 301 list are negatively

associated, with Tech. The within-entity adjusted R2 indicates that the overall model explains
about 56% of Tech’s variation.

Regressions on Edu
I turn now to the tests of Edu and its covariates, reported in Table 8. Stronger copyright
exceptions for educational uses benefit students (as well as teachers and educational
establishments) by opening up the availability of articles and books for learning – so I expect that
societies which place a higher emphasis on education to have stronger educational exceptions. I
use data on the average years of schooling attained by individuals in a given year/country, taken
from the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment dataset (Barro & Lee, 2013) as an indicator of social
emphasis on education. This is included in the tests below as the variable Ave. Years of
Schooling. Column (1) shows a significant positive coefficient on Ave. Years of Schooling when
it is the sole right hand variable.
Copyright Share again measures the share of copyright industries’ value added to a nation’s
GDP in a given year. As before, it is expected to be negative, as economies with larger copyright
sectors may have weaker copyright exceptions. Copyright Share is positively correlated with
Ave. Years of Schooling (correlation coefficient = 0.65) and its coefficient becomes insignificant
in regressions with both variables included, so the test reported in Table 5 include these
explanatory variables in separate regressions. Column (2) shows a negative coefficient on
Copyright Share when it is the sole regressor.
Columns (3) through (6) show specifications with additional controls. The coefficients on
Ave. Years of Schooling and Copyright Share remain significant at the 95% level of confidence
throughout. Columns (3) and (4) add (Log) GDP per capita, which enters insignificantly when
alongside Ave. Years of Schooling, and is significant at the 90% level alongside Copyright Share.

Table 8: Dependent Variable: Edu
Panel Regressions with F.E. for countries and years
(1)
Ave. Years of Schooling

(2)

0.123***
(0.0329)

Copyright Share

(3)

(4)

0.109**
(0.0454)
-0.602***
(0.198)

(Log) GDP per capita

N
Within Entity R2

0.366
(0.321)
377
0.297

2.219***
(0.153)
308
0.127

(6)

0.097**
(0.040)

0.0689
(0.138)

-0.554**
(0.190)
0.288*
(0.153)

-0.163
(1.075)
377
0.299

-0.684
(1.588)
308
0.313

FTA

Constant

(5)

-0.002
(0.090)
0.252***
(0.058)

-0.493**
(0.199)
0.241
(0.145)
0.286***
(0.058)

0.499
(0.678)
356
0.422

-0.398
(1.485)
286
0.427

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Columns (5) and (6) add the dummy variable FTA, and drop observations from the U.S. The
coefficients on FTA is significant at the 99% confidence level in both specifications. Columns
(3-6) suggest that educational exceptions, which include legal provisions less commercial in
nature, are unassociated or weakly associated with macroeconomic growth, but may be
strengthened when copyright laws are revisited through FTA implementation processes.
I conclude this subsection with a closer look at the final specifications, those in Columns (5) and
(6). The coefficient on Ave. Years of Schooling remains significant at the 95% level when the
controls are added. The specification in Column (5) predicts that one additional year of schooling
for the average citizen is associated with a 0.10 unit increase in Edu. The coefficient on
Copyright Share remains significant at the 95% level with the inclusion of controls in Column
(6). It predicts that a one-percentage point increase in the share of GDP produced by the

copyright industries is associated with a 0.49 unit decline in Edu. In columns (5) and (6), there is
no significant relationship between (Log) GDP per capita and Edu, while FTA is positive at the
99% level. The overall fit for the regressions on Edu is not as strong as the fit for the regressions
on Tech. The within-entity adjusted R2 is below 0.42 in column (5) and 0.43 in column (6),
suggesting the possibility of omitted variable bias.

Robustness Tests
Tech and Edu are the unweighted averages of the category means for the categories that
build each index. In order to test the robustness of these metrics, I randomly adjust the weights of
each category, yielding new variables with similar descriptive statistics to the originals. I then
use the randomly weighted versions of Tech and Edu in the final specifications of the regressions
on covariates reported above.
Four randomly weighted ("RW") variables are created for both Tech and Edu using weights
generated from values drawn from a uniform distribution within 0.01, 0.02, 0.3 and 0.4 standard
deviations of each of the category scores’ mean weight in the original variables. (The last weight
for each is equal to 1 minus the sum of the other weights.) Table 9 shows the randomly weighted
variables’ descriptive statistics. All of the randomly weighted versions of both variables have a
similar mean and standard deviation to the original version. None of the randomly weighted
variables are significantly skewed.

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Randomly Weighted Tech and Edu Variables
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Skewness

Tech

1.13

0.66

-0.26

Tech_RW1

1.11

0.60

0.36

Tech_RW2

1.09

0.61

0.43

Tech_RW3

1.05

060

0.38

Tech_RW4

1.04

0.61

0.36

Edu

1.52

0.65

-0.25

Edu_RW1

1.53

0.66

-0.28

Edu_RW2

1.54

0.66

-0.32

Edu_RW3

1.54

0.66

-032

Edu_RW4

1.64

0.66

-0.35

I test the randomly weighted versions of Tech, using the final specification from the
previous section. Table 10 presents the results, with Column (1) showing regression results using
the original, unweighted Tech, and columns (2) through (5) showing the randomly weighted
versions. The coefficients on all variables keep the expected algebraic signs. The coefficients on
Computer Services Share are significant at the 95% level in each of the tests, while the
coefficients on Copyright Share remain significant at the 90% level or higher. All coefficients on
the control variables remain significant as well. The adjusted R2 falls slightly when the random
weights are applied.
Next, I regress the randomly weighted versions of Edu, again using the final specification
from the previous section. Tables 11.1 and 11.2 report the results, with the first column showing
results from regressions on the unweighted Edu and columns (2) through (5) showing the
randomly weighted variables. The coefficients on Ave. Years of Schooling remain positive and

Table 10: Dependent Variables – Tech, both Unweighted and Randomly Weighted
Panel Regressions with F.E. for countries and years
(1)
Tech

(2)
Tech_RW1

(3)
Tech_RW2

(4)
Tech_RW3

(5)
Tech_RW4

Comp. Services Share

0.207**
(0.078)

0.221**
(0.082)

0.233**
(0.084)

0.249**
(0.093)

0.271**
(0.100)

Copyright Share

-0.501*
(0.234)

-0.537**
(0.241)

-0.585**
(0.253)

-0.538*
(0.259)

-0.574*
(0.276)

(Log) GDP per capita

0.285*
(0.143)

0.302*
(0.151)

0.332*
(0.159)

0.299*
(0.159)

0.306*
(0.169)

FTA

0.453***
(0.113)

0.457***
(0.115)

0.465***
(0.127)

0.455***
(0.107)

0.467***
(0.105)

Special 301

-0.112**
(0.048)

-0.117**
(0.050)

-0.126**
(0.054)

-0.126**
(0.053)

-0.129**
(0.056)

-1.426
(1.330)

-1.599
(1.406)

-1.796
(1.488)

-1.636
(1.480)

-1.711
(1.573)

286
0.548

286
0.535

Constant
N
Within Entity R2

286
286
286
0.585
0.584
0.587
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11.1: Dependent Variables – Edu, both Unweighted and Randomly Weighted
Panel Regressions with F.E. for countries and years
(1)
Edu

(2)
Edu_RW1

(3)
Edu_RW2

(4)
Edu_RW3

(5)
Edu_RW4

Ave. Years of Schooling

0.099**
(0.040)

0.091**
(0.037)

0.097**
(0.039)

0.092**
(0.037)

0.109**
(0.044)

(Log) GDP per capita

-0.002
(0.090)

0.015
(0.089)

0.006
(0.091)

0.015
(0.090)

-0.009
(0.100)

0.252***
(0.058)

0.229***
(0.055)

0.248***
(0.058)

0.232***
(0.056)

0.282***
(0.0643)

0.499
(0.678)

0.459
(0.692)

0.491
(0.691)

0.463
(0.698)

0.524
(0.691)

356
0.407

356
0.438

FTA

Constant
N
Within Entity R2

356
356
356
0.422
0.403
0.419
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11.2: Dependent Variables – Edu, both Unweighted and Randomly Weighted
Panel Regressions with F.E. for countries and years

Copyright Share
(Log) GDP per capita
FTA

Constant
N
Within Entity R2

(1)
Edu

(2)
Edu_RW1

(3)
Edu_RW2

(4)
Edu_RW3

(5)
Edu_RW4

-0.493**
(0.199)

-0.508**
(0.199)

-0.530**
(0.198)

-0.534**
(0.198)

-0.553**
(0.199)

0.241
(0.145)

0.234
(0.140)

0.250
(0.147)

0.243
(0.145)

0.272
(0.157)

0.286***
(0.058)

0.289***
(0.052)

0.274***
(0.043)

0.287***
(0.045)

0.263***
(0.040)

-0.398
(1.485)

-0.309
(1.430)

-0.444
(1.502)

-0.372
(1.481)

-0.640
(1.615)

286
0.438

286
0.423

286
286
286
0.427
0.434
0.428
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

significant at the 95% level across specifications in Table 11.1 and the coefficients on Copyright
Share are negative and significant at the 95% level across specifications in Table 11.2. The
coefficient on FTA remains positive and significant, and the coefficient on (Log) GDP per capita
is insignificant across the board. The adjusted R2s for the tests of randomly weighted Edu
variables are similar to the adjusted R2s for the unweighted ones. Overall, the same relationships
found in the regressions on the unweighted Edu variable tend to hold when its elements are
randomly weighted.

Conclusion
This working paper has presented a novel dataset designed to measure changes in 24
nations’ laws on copyright exceptions over time. The dataset is unique among sources of
information on copyright exceptions because others are static. It is my hope that researchers can
use the dataset to add to the relatively small body of empirical research in this area.

The data shows that the sample countries' copyright exceptions have grown stronger over
time, that the high-income countries have consistently had stronger copyright exceptions on
average than middle-income ones, and that the gap between the two subgroups has grown.
Empirical test show that changes to copyright exceptions useful to ICT firms are stronger in
countries with larger ICT sectors, and copyright exceptions useful for education are stronger in
countries with higher educational attainments. Both types of exceptions are weaker in countries
where the copyright industries contribute a higher share of GDP. Both tend to be stronger in
countries that have signed free trade agreements with the U.S., and then had to amend their laws
to comply with the treaty obligations. Copyright exceptions relevant to ICT firms also tend to be
stronger in countries with higher GDP per capita, and tend to be lower in countries that have
faced bilateral trade pressures from the U.S. through the Special 301 process.
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